... projects currently in vogue present difficult problems which remain to be solved and their solution is inhibited by programming procedures better suited to large capital development projects than to people-centered development.
But means and impediments are hardly mentioned.
Unfortunately more than three decades of modern development experience provide substantial evidence that this paucity of attention to how development efforts can effectively elicit the participation of the rural poor cannot be explained either in terms of the problem being too new to be recognized or having long since been solved.
Failures of the Past
In particular, experiences over the past three decades with cooperatives and community development movements in the Third World provide some sobering lessons.
Coperatives
The member controlled cooperative has long been an idea with almost universal appeal, being widely promoted in much of the developing world as an integral instrument of national rural development policy. But the typical outcome can be summarized briefly.
[Rlural cooperatives in developing areas today bring little benefit to the masses of poorer inhabitants of those areas and cannot be generally regarded as agents of change and development for such groups. It is the better-off rural inhabitants who mainly take advantage of the cooperative services and facilities such as government supported credit and technical assistance channelled through cooperatives. 7 Often the services offered by cooperatives, such as production loans and marketing services are of little use to the landless laborer or the subsistence farmer. In cooperatives with community wide membership the distribution of control over their activities tends to parallel the structure of control in the broader community. In relatively stratified communities its poorer members seldom have a voice and commonly find themselves ineligible for certain services such as loans. Moreover, too often the co-op leaders are corrupt and abusive of their power. Where the poor have organized their own co-ops to challenge established community interests they have commonly faced retaliatory actions they were ill-equipped to resist.8 Women may be excluded, except when there is no male head of household, even where women are the chief agricultural producers.9
One reason suggested for the failures is that these cooperatives too often have been creations of government, intended to promote government policies and provide government control over markets, rather than voluntary creations of individuals to increase their collective market power.'" In most Asian countries they enjoy so little popular support and so little market power that if government pressures and inducements such as access to special services and subsidies were withdrawn most would soon become inactive."
One study of 14 cooperatives in Asia included four that were comparatively successful. These had four characteristics in common: (1) they were located in communities with relatively unstratified and cohesive social structures; (2) their internal structures allowed members to hold leaders accountable and enforced member discipline; (3) a relatively homogeneous membership of small and medium landholders saw the co-op as an instrument for capital formation and the introduction of technical innovations rather than simply a means for obtaining government facilities; and (4) they had strong external linkages with relatively effective government agencies which not only regulated their functioning but also provided training, services, facilities, and assistance in resolving conflicts between members.2 Such preconditions are of course demanding and not always replicable.
Community Development
Though the roots of the community development movement can be traced back to the 1920s13 it was a Ford Foundation funded pilot project introduced in the Etawah District of Uttar Pradesh, India in October 1948 which initiated the chain of events that brought it into prominence in the post-colonial era. Using multi-purpose village level workers in the Etawah project achieved impressive results in self-help approaches to increasing agricultural production and strengthening rural infrastructure. In 1952, the In-SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW dian government adopted the concept as the basis of a major national rural development effort. However, it failed to adopt the painstaking approach to developing a participative administrative structure able to respond to bottom-up initiatives which had been the key to the Etawah project's success. 14 The attention attracted by India's launching of a national community development effort led to the initiation of similar programs in over 60 nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the 1950s, labeled by Holdcroft as Community Development's "Decade of Prominence." But by 1960 some programs were already faltering and by 1965 most had been terminated or drastically reduced. Community development had promised much, yet delivered little. 15 With changes in national governments came the desire of new leaders to establish their commitment to new and, presumably, more powerful development concepts. Central economic planning was embraced, with an emphasis on programs promoting immediate economic growth." Community development offices were abolished or integrated into other organizations. '7 The decline may have reflected impatience as much as anything; perhaps it was unrealistic to expect any program to achieve significant results in the reduction of poverty and food shortages in so short a period."8 But a number of characteristic weaknesses have been identified in the concept and its implementation."
(1) Existing power structures were accepted as a given and no attempt was made to change them. Village level workers aligned themselves with the traditional village elites who captured such benefits as the programs offered. Recognizing this, the poor majority did not respond. The conflicts of interest inherent in stratified village social structures were not recognized in program designs.
(2) Responsibility for implementation of community development was placed in administratively separate ministries or agencies which paralleled the established line agencies of government. Attempts were made at local levels to bring these parallel agencies under the control of the community development agency in the interests of improved coordination, but this resulted in bureaucratic conflict that was often a key element in the movement's demise.
(3) Greater emphasis tended to be placed on the expansion of social services than on increasing rural incomes, and many of the social services offered seemed of doubtful value. This was not so much a function of the community development concept-the Etawah pilot project had stressed promoting agricultural production-as an outcome of bureaucratic territoriality.20 (4) Implementation was done through conventional bureaucratic structures in which programs and targets were formulated centrally with little regard to the willingness or capability of the people to respond; often little real participation was involved. Demands that field workers report on the implementation of dozens of centrally mandated activities seriously cut into the time available for actual work with the community. When working with the community, the field worker easily fell into the pattern of actually directing local level programs. Again, these patterns were in sharp contrast to the Etawah pilot project which had stressed the development of organizational processes that placed a premium on being responsive to community identified needs.21 (5) Little was done to build independent member controlled local organizations able to solve local problems and make demands on the broader system. Furthermore, the village itself tended to be treated as a self-contained development unit with little attention given to the need to link self-governing villages into larger, more economically viable regional units.
Current Donor Experience
The current concern for the rural poor and their participation in the development process has had an important impact on national agency and donor funding priorities, but experience indicates that the reallocation of funds is not enough. The types of projects currently in vogue present difficult problems which remain to be solved and their solution is inhibited by programming procedures better suited to large capital development projects than to peoplecentered rural development.
In the discussion that follows the focus is on large donors because the information is accessible and their numbers are comparatively small. It is more difficult to generalize about the diverse national experiences, however. National and even sub-national development programmers are in general working with priorities and programming methods similar to those of the major donors-in part as a result of donor influence-and face corresponding pressures.
Experience with Poverty Focused Programming
The World Bank has responded to the new emphasis on poverty by realigning its loan portfolio to increase the proportion of loans going to countries with an annual per capita income below $280. It has also substantially increased the percentage of its portfolio devoted to agriculture and rural development projects, and since FY73 over half of these projects have been chosen and designed specifically to benefit the rural poor.2 Its rural development sector policy paper calls explicitly for:
Participation by the rural poor in the planning and implementation processes through local government, project advisory committees, cooperatives and other forms of group organi7ation.
Under the 1973 foreign assistance legislation passed by the United States Congress, commonly referred to as "The New Directions Mandate," not only have the priorities of USAID been reoriented, it is largely restricted to assistance targeted directly to the poor majority-with participation a major theme. It is publicly committed to the concept that the economic benefits of its development projects should be "widely and significantly shared by the poor"; and that the poor, including women, should be actively engaged in decision making and implementation in ways which increase "their technical skills and/or their capacity to organize for common purposes and for greater access to the benefits of The Bank's PIDER Project in Mexico has received special attention because its plan incorporated many advanced concepts for integrated area development. An important design feature was to be extensive popular participation in project decision making and implementation. A recent Bank staff paper concluded that the early commitments of the Mexican implementing agencies to a participatory approach were little more than wishful thinking since no local mechanisms had been developed to give reality to the Viewed in historical perspective the current "new directions" are perhaps less a new thrust in development assistance than a return swing of the pendulum as the results produced by the economic planners during their period of ascendance come into question much as did the work of the community developers before them. Holdcroft suggests that too little attention was given to building a coherent body of knowledge out of the theory and empirical experience of the community development era with the result that many of its lessons remain unlearned.31 The result is a new generation of planners, trained primarily in the tools of economic analysis, responding to an appealing concept that promised to overcome some failures of what, for them, were more familiar approaches, but which was not so new as it seemed.
Fortunately, not all of the lessons have gone unobserved. More emphasis is now placed on making participation a concern of all agencies engaged in rural development, on economic benefits, and on regional integration. Yet, others seem to have gone largely unrecognized. Thus, we continue to see: (a) reliance for the planning and implementation of "participative" development on centralized bureaucratic organizations which have little capacity to respond to diverse community-defined needs or to build from community skills and values; (b) inadequate investment in the difficult process of building community problem solving capacity; (c) inadequate attention to dealing with social diversity, and especially with highly stratified social structures, and (d) insufficient integration of the technical and social components of development action. These are areas in which the barriers to appropriate action have proven most formidable and it is important to stress the fact that the lack of money is not the central problem.
Constraints on Public Donors
If a lesson emerges out of this accumulated experience, it is that in dealing with the poor, redirection of funds to new categories of projects is only part of the need. Another part is building the capacity of donor organizations-whether SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 483 public or private, foreign or national, planner or implementor-to provide assistance in ways which respond to local needs while building local social and technical capacity. Unfortunately, most large donors seem to be under substantial pressure not to follow this latter course-the rhetoric of current project documents notwithstanding. 32 Excessive pressures for immediate results, as measured by goods and services delivered, drive out attention to institution building and make it difficult to move beyond a relief and welfare approach to poverty; the distribution of food is a lot faster than teaching people how to grow it. A substantial bias toward project as contrasted to program funding compounds the problems. Projects by nature deal with time bounded start-up costs and emphasize facilities and equipment to the neglect of the development and funding of capacities for their sustained operation and maintenance. Their demands for detailed, up-front planning, coupled with rigorous adherence to fast-paced implementation schedules and pre-planned specifications, assumes task requirements are well understood when, in fact, even the nature of the problem is ill defined. Furthermore it virtually ensures that the real decisions will remain with professional technicians and government bureaucrats neither of whom are rewarded for being responsive to local conditions nor contributing toward the development of local institutional capacities.
Emphasis on meeting project disbursement schedules and on terminal project outcomes leads to an insistence on the creation of special project units, using special incentives to buy people away from more permanent organizations and, thus, undermining their potential for sustained long-term action. Pressures to move ever-larger amounts of money quickly without commensurate staff increases place a premium on large capital and technology intensive projects. As a consequence, heavy import components are best able to absorb such large sums of money on schedule, whereas effective work with the rural poor requires a high ratio of people to financial input; and it almost always takes longer than anticipated. When a large donor such as the World Bank operates with a few field offices, relying instead on the supervision of itinerant groups of experts with divergent views making quick judgments during short visits, there is little prospect of providing the consistent, informed, and PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW sympathetic support required for effective institution building.
In general the need is for a flexible, sustained, experimental, action based capacity building style of assistance which most major donors are ill equipped to provide. The result is a substantial gap between what donors espouse as policy and what they actually find themselves pressured to do by their own political and bureaucratic imperatives.33 (See Figure 1.) As an example, the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) stated policy in irrigation development is to emphasize: (a) low cost per hectare, (b) many small farmer beneficiaries, and (c) production gains within a short time, such as two to five years. These criteria should lead it to emphasize rehabilitation of small irrigation systems, but, in fact, the costs are so low and spread among so many individual systems that it is difficult to build a substantial project loan around such work. Thus, the average ADB irrigation loan was for $40 million in 1978, with the pressures in the direction of increasing this average so the ADB sought further expansion of its total lending. 3 A partial answer is greater emphasis on program as contrasted to project funding and both the World Bank and the ADB are currently experimenting with program style loans less tied to schedules and blueprint style plans.35 However, unless institutional capacity building is included as an integral part of the loan package, the approach assumes the prior existence of strong administering organizations able to take a responsible, flexible, and locally responsive approach in the commitment of its funds. Generally such an assumption is unwarranted.
USAID provides its own examples of contradictions between purpose and procedure. While its mandate and rhetoric stress participation of the poor in decision making, exactly where the poor are to be involved in the sequence of its project development process is unclear. The fact is that USAID is accountable to the U.S. Congress and to agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget, not to the poor villagers to whose needs it is supposed to be responding. Not surprisingly, the USAID programmer is more likely to be proccupied with the needs and involvement of the groups that arbitrate his program than with those of the FIGURE 1 Contradictions in Foreign Assistance Programming poor beneficiaries; indeed the agency's procedures all but ensure it. In preparing a Project Paper for approval in Washington the USAID program officer must comply with detailed specifications spelled out in a guidance document of more than 100 pages. One result of such requirements is that even host government counterparts tend to exclude themselves from the USAID planning process, having neither the time nor the patience to involve themselves in the form filling exercise. Moreover, in the process of avoiding the more pointless routine, they are also excluded from participation in the feasibility analysis, implementation planning, and budgeting.3' The result is that whatever learning emerges from these exercises accrues to the USAID programmers and consultants, not to the local agencies who ultimately will have the responsibility for implementation.
Nonetheless, USAID is on the whole making the most serious effort of any large donor to come to grips with the problems of improving on its past performance in dealing with rural poverty." The number, competence, and commitment of the people working on this problem throughout the agency is impressive. Just how successful they can be, given the constraints imposed by agency's political environment and its own procedures, remains to be seen.
The Positive Side: Five Asian Success Stories
As discouraging as the general picture is, not all efforts at participative approaches to rural development have failed. This section presents a series of cases from Asia on experiences that share three characteristics in common: each involves a rural development effort which seeks to engage rural people in their own advancement; each is generally recognized as more successful than the average; and each is dependent on effective program action more than on a uniquely favorable setting. Beyond that, the cases were chosen for their diversity in objectives, setting, and approach. These five cases on individual programs cover the Indian National Dairy Development Board, the Sri Lankan Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, the Thailand Community Based Family Planning Services, and the Philippine National Irrigation Administration Communal Irrigation Program. At the end of the section a brief discussion of some of the politically motivated peasant movements which have been a significant factor in modern Asian history provides additional perspective.
Indian National Dairy Development Board
One form of village action that has enjoyed more than typical success in the Third World is the vertically integrated single industry cooperative. Among the various examples, which include the Colombian coffee and the Malaysian rubber growers association, the system of dairy cooperatives promoted by the Indian National Dairy Development Board has attracted particular international interest. By the end of 1976 a total of 4,530 village cooperatives with a combined membership of 2 million farmers had been organized, and efforts were underway to develop a system of similar small milk producer cooperatives throughout In- Excessive pressures for immediate results, as measured by goods and services delivered, drive out attention to institution building and make it difficult to move beyond a relief and welfare approach to poverty; the distribution of food is a lot faster than teaching people how to grow it.
Kurien learned along with the farmers in a village setting. Once a successful prototype program had been worked out, largely by the farmers, it was not passed to some established organization for boader replication. Rather, a new organization grew around the prototype-from the bottom upgradually building and testing its own capacity to provide effective support to federations of primary cooperatives and adding additional layers at its top as the program expanded. Appropriate management systems were worked out through experience to meet the demands of the program. The values of integrity, service, and commitment to the poorest member-producers were deeply imbedded in its emerging structures. Management staff were hired fresh from school, trained through experience on the job, indoctrinated in the values of the program, and advanced rapidly as it grew.
The process of bottom-up learning and growth from within continued for 10 years before the effort extended beyond Gujarat state, and when the National Dairy Development Board was created in 1965 it was with the village trained Kurien as its head. We may assume as well that most of the personnel and systems of the NDDB were absorbed directly from the cooperatives it was to serve and replicate. Much experience with the village people and the dairy industry had been accumulated and assimilated into the organization by that time.
The NDDB is currently planning a major expansion program to be funded by a $150 million loan from the World Bank and sales of dairy commodities donated by foreign governments. It will also move simultaneously into a new program of vegetable oil cooperatives. To the current professional staff of 600, the new programs will require the addition of 400 new managers per year for the next several years to be trained in a new NDDB established management school. The combination of rapid expansion into states which present different institutional settings, a basic shift in its approach to management development, and a move into a new type of program-possibly foregoing the long process of bottom-up.program design and organization building that characterized the milk program-will no doubt place substantial pressures on the NDDB. It will be instructive to see whether it can replicate its own success under such conditions.
Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement of Sri Lanka
The Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement (SSM)41 of Sri Lanka is both private and national in scope, has a strong religious orientation, operates without formal ties to government, and, like the Indian National Dairy Development Board, was built from a modest village experience by a bold and charismatic leader. Yet, while the NDDB was built on a structure of carefully designed management systems and emphasized economic outcomes, the SSM has given more of its attention to the articulation of its philosophy than to building appropriate management systems and has emphasized changes in the heart of man over changes in village economies and social structures. The origins of SSM trace back to 1958 when a government rural development officer proposed to the principal and teachers of Nalanda College, a small Buddhist secondary school, that they seek to acquaint their students with the problems of rural life through participation in a workstudy camp in a poor rural village. The idea appealed to them as a unique educational experience. One of these teachers was the young A. T. Ariyaratne, around whose philosophy and personality the SSM was later build. 4 The first camp was held in December 1958. The village selected consisted of 35 Rodiya families, members of a despised caste that lived by begging. Routinely suffering the most extreme forms of discrimination, they were barred from attending school or even receiving religious rites as no member of a higher caste, not even the monks, would have any association with them. To enter a Rodiya home or drink from a cup which a Rodiya had touched was nearly unthinkable for a non-Rodiya. It was, thus, a notable event when a group of 80 students, teachers; boy scouts, and government officials from middle-class families set off to share their labor with the people of Kanatholuwa village in digging wells and latrines, constructing a small road, and performing other services. Each participant contributed even the money for his own food and shared in the tasks of pitching tents and food preparation.
The camp lasted only 10 days. The actual participation of the village people except as recipients was minimal; and follow-up action was left to the government. But the significance of the camp was not found in the wells and latrines constructed, so much as in the fact that 80 members of the middle class had engaged for 10 days in manual labor in the service of an outcaste class.
The timing of the camp was right as Sri Lanka was in the midst of a social awakening to the plight of rural peoples and the inequities of the caste system. The camp was well publicized in the Colombo press and its participants quickly won broad recognition, including a letter of commendation from the Prime Minister. Soon other camps, known as Shramadanas, were being organized, each bringing more urban middle and upper class volunteers into contact with the realities of rural poverty and caste discrimination.
In the early 1960s a major reorientation of the basic program occurred: its philosophy, based on Buddhist teachings, took explicit shape and a concern for sustained village level development action led to recruiting the village monk as a community development worker. The village temple emerged as the center of Sarvodaya development activity. In 1968, a plan was launched for the comprehensive development efforts in 100 villages based on the new concept.
Foreign funding was introduced in the early 1970s leading to the establishment of a permanent headquarters and bureaucracy. A wide range of new, centrally planned and funded activities emerged, including the operation of cooperative farms. In 1975, the 100-village program was expanded to 1,000 villages. Training centers were established to train women who would manage preschool child care and mother-child feeding centers, to prepare youth for community development work, and to develop skills in agriculture and technical fields. All educational programs were to instill a commitment to serving the poorest of Sri Lanka's poor.
In 1978, a case study by Nandasena Ratnapala, a local university professor, noted that the breadth of Sarvodaya's membership involvement and the strength of its spiritual commitment had not always been translated into program accomplishment.45 Though activities had been undertaken in 2,000 villages, the programs were more or less permanently established in only about 300. Only a fraction of those eligible participated directly in SSM activities, mainly as passive beneficiaries of services provided by SSM staff and the local monks. The leadership training and designated patterns of village organization had not, in most villages, resulted in a self-reliant development process. In the training courses, weaknesses were noted in course content, competence of instructors, and teaching methods. Evidence of abuse in the handling of funds had resulted in the centralization of control over individual village program actions, turning the regional and extension centers into little more than "channels for transmitting and carrying out directives from the central level."4'
With the introduction of major foreign funding, SSM had introduced radically new program activities and organization forms while simultaneously undertaking rapid expansion before either were tested. While it remained an important moral force and continued to enlist Sri Lankans from all social strata in the cause of the poor, its developmental impact was limited to a small minority of the villages in which it worked. When Ratnapala's study appeared, Ariyaratne responded by inviting him to join the SSM as head of its newly established Research Institute. While seeking to demonstrate a continuing commitment to the basic philosophies of the movement, the studies of the institute sought to stimulate sober reflection on the gaps between the philosophy and the realities of its performance.47 One of its first studies noted that:48 * Candidates for layman's training programs were supposed to be selected by the people, yet some were selected by local influentials even in direct contravention of decisions by local groups. Also, community development trainees were being selected by the local member of parliament. * The villages chosen to receive SSM assistance were supposed to be isolated, inhabited by under-privileged classes, lacking essential public services, and having unique social, economic, or cultural problems; yet any village in which a few enthusiastic individuals expressed interest was being admitted.
* Whenever financial resources were provided centrally, equal contributions of finance or labor were to be provided by the community; yet the salaries of key village volunteers and most other expenses were being met entirely by the center, including the salaries of the preschool teachers which originally were to be raised by the village.
The study went on to note that while the leaders of SSM were once in direct daily contact with the village programs, thus ensuring effective upward communication, they had since become separated from the village volunteers by elab- In agriculture, the BRAC workers cultivated their own demonstratin plots at their camp sites, which usually consisted of two acres of rice and a half acre of vegetables. As was duly noted by the farmers of the area, this was an unusual activity for college graduates. The stature of the BRAC workers as agricultural advisors was substantially enhanced when their fields produced some of the best crops seen in the area. Farmers in selected project areas received technical assistance through group meetings, as well as assistance in obtaining new seeds and other inputs. Several groups totalling 300 landless laborers were assisted in obtaining leases on 500 acres of fallow government and privately owned land.53 Irrigation and flood control projects were constructed under "food for work" projects. Other efforts included providing fishermen with boats and with twine for nets. Special women's programs provided training in vocational skills such as sewing.
A number of cooperatives already existed in the project area when BRAC arrived, though most were ineffective in serving the broader population, having been taken over by the larger landowners who monopolized the benefits government channeled through them. BRAC was able to rejuvenate many through member training, encouragement of regular meetings, introduction of improved accounting practices, and initiation of government audits. A number of new societies were formed, including second and third tiered structures at union and thana levels.
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As experience was gained in each of these undertakings, further insights began to emerge. * Those who were benefiting most from the BRAC programs were those with relatively larger landholdings as too few of its programs addressed the needs of the landless or near landless.
* While BRAC had been attempting to form all members of a village into a single organi7ation, the interests of landed and landless were so opposed that it was nearly impossible for a single community based organization to serve them both simultaneously. Overall the predominantly centrally planned sectoral programs had consistently gravitated toward patterns of operation that mainly benefited the more easily reachable and the relatively better-off to the neglect of the more disadvantaged.
Phase III: The People Approach. Numerous actions were taken to correct the deficiencies identified in Phase II. Some were fairly specific such as the decisions to train fulltime female village health workers to serve the preventive and simple curative health needs of mothers and young children, and to hire females as paramedics and multipurpose development workers.
More basic was the shift during 1975 and 1976 toward a more people centered approach targeted entirely to the poorest 50 percent of the village population-defined operationally as those families whose livelihoods depended in part on selling labor to third parties-with program initiatives coming largely from the beneficiaries. Groups of 20 to 30 were organized around similar economic interests such as landless laborers, destitute women, and fishermen. The functional literacy training was used to build an organization, raise consciousness, and lead into joint activities responsive to identified needs. For example, landless laborers organized to lease land, destitute women to undertake paddy processing, and fishermen to purchasse a boat. As projects were identified by each group, BRAC provided resources such as credit or "food for work" grains. Once a few such groups were established in a village it had been anticipated that they would assist in forming other groups through a building block process until all the poor of the village were organized. Experimentation with these methods continues in certain BRAC project areas. There has been a concern that the smaller groups might develop fairly exclusive interests, making the process of building toward a village-wide organization of the poor more difficult than anticipated. Consequently BRAC was experimenting in its Rural Credit and Training Project and its Outreach Program with a new approach which featured: * An initial survey done by outreach staff provides a point of entry to the village and identifies members of the target group-i.e., those households in which labor is sold to third parties.
* Informal discussions are initiated at traditional gathering places to identify the major concerns of the poor and potential leaders. The discussion groups tend to grow until a village assembly is held and an organization of the poor formed to address the issues of immediate and mutual concern to them.
* As leaders are identified they are sent to the BRAC training center at Savar to learn organizing and consciousness raising methods. The contact here with leaders from similar villages builds awareness that others throughout Bangladesh share a similar plight. The approach of the Outreach Program generates some helpful process dynamics. First the financially more secure villagers normally exclude themselves from participation as soon as they learn that BRAC is not providing handouts and that many of the activities involve manual labor. Second, as the organi7ed poor of a village set about to negotiate for higher wage rates they quickly learn that they can be effective only if neighboring villages are also organized; consequently, they set about on their own to organize them. As word spreads, people come from villages miles away asking the organi7ed villages for assistance in organizing. As the process builds a momentum of its own there is a significant decline in the BRAC staff input required per village organi7ed.
Phase III also brought the introduction of a research unit to analyze fundamental socioeconomic problems. BRAC staff see research as a powerful tool for program improvement, using it to address program relevant questions relating to the dynamics of rural poverty, seeking insights into questions such as: Who controls that assets in the rural village and why?55 How are some families able to advance themselves, while others become increasingly impoverished? How do peasants perceive famine? Credit? Such studies have documented how population pressures have combined with crop failures to break down traditionally protective social structures, leading to the conclusion that access to consumption credit in time of crisis is more important to most poor families than access to production credit.5s BRAC is re-examining its credit programs accordingly.
With the change in orientation "participatory research" techniques were introduced, such as asking a peasant panel to discuss a designated topic and then recording their observations. A staff facilitator keeps the discussion within a piearranged framework, but allows the participants maximum scope in exploring the subject.
Villagers concerned about the misappropriation of "food for work" grains by corrupt officials inspired a study on corruption. When they asked BRAC's help it was decided nothing could be done without more information. BRAC staff members started recording reports from villagers. This stimulated still more reports. Adding data gathered from official records, BRAC workers and the villagers determined exactly how much each individual was taking and how. When Union Councils and Thama officials were presented with these facts, "food for work" grains suddenly became available to the poor for their projects. One observation which emerges from these undertakings is that as research has become integral to program operations, the line between researcher, field worker, and even the people themselves is no longer well defined-each participates in agenda setting, data collection, and interpretation.
[What is neededfor success is]... a high degree of fit between program design, beneficiary needs, and the capacities of the assisting organization.
BRAC's responsive style of programming has emerged within the framework of well developed management systems designed to facilitate decentralized operation within a strong but evolving policy framework. Abed's leadership style encourages open discussion of difficult issues and acceptance of apparent errors, yet provides firm decisions when they are needed. BRAC's organization conforms to the Likert model of overlapping teams. Each team meets on a regular basis for discussion of current problems, and each member of the staff is assisted in developing skills as a discussion leader.57 Continually investing in development of new skills and methodologies, BRAC sends its personnel into the village armed with a good deal more than high ideals.5'
The spontaneous replication BRAC is observing is probably the strongest available indicator that its program is truly meeting felt needs, yet BRAC faces some important challenges. Powerful social forces toward positive changes have been set in motion by the BRAC approach, and maintaining the momentum of those forces without incurring a major backlash poses a difficult challenge. BRAC is also preparing to launch a nation-wide single purpose program to train rural mothers in oral rehydration techniques for treating diarrhea. Two thousand new workers will be added to its staff of 378 (January 1980 figures),s' working under a separate supervisory structure. Thus, BRAC will be simultaneously running two programs based on quite different operating requirements. What strains this may place on its organization remain to be seen. Testing and revision continued during the early expansion. Various types of distributors were tried-including village headmen and farmers-and the methods of selection were refined. Alternative supervision and resupply systems were tested: a "G Model" relied on government medical officers to select and train distributors, provide logistical support, and collect the funds; in a "P Model" these functions were all performed by CBFPS personnel. Two lessons were learned: the medical officers, whose primary responsibility was for clinic operations, could not simultaneously manage a village-based system, but their cooperation was very important. Thus, CBFPS subsequently handled all operations but paid the medical officers a fixed honorarium to act as "medical supervisors." Later, when the government created a new post of district public health officer to supervise village-based midwives, responsibility for medical supervision was transferred to them. Lessons were learned in promotion as well: family planning movies were popular, but had little impact on acceptance rates; colored condoms made colorful promotions but the pill was the preferred method among the villagers.
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Learning was also involved in developing effective management systems. Complaints from distributors established that resupply of contraceptive pills and condoms by mail was unreliable. Finally a system was devised whereby supervisors received supplies at their monthly meeting for delivery to the village distributors who also received prepaid, pre-addressed post cards to mail to Bangkok whenever supplies failed to arrive. At the same meeting statistical reports were collected, results reviewed and new targets set. A commission system for supervisors was introduced in 1978.
As the program grew, new layers of management were added at the top, but to ensure continued contact with actual field operations, all staff were scheduled to make Government assistance to small farmer-owned and operated gravity irrigation systems in the Philippines traces back to the early 1900s, but it was generally limited to the construction of physical facilities. Especially during the 1950s and 60s it was dominated by "pork barrel" politics which spread available funds over so many different projects that planning and construction were often inadequate. In the early 1970s efforts were made to correct the deficiencies of the past, but even with more rational allocation of funds many completed systems fell rapidly into disuse or served substantially fewer farmers than intended. One theory argued that attention was needed to helping the farmers form effective associations able to perform the operations and maintenance tasks once construction was completed.
Consequently, two actions were taken in 1976 by the NIA, which was responsible for overall irrigation development in the Philippines. One was to conclude an agreement with the Farm Systems Development Corporation (FSDC), a public corporation with experience in developing small pump fed irrigation systems, under which FSDC would organize farmers to operate and maintain many of the physical systems which the NIA was constructing." Coordination was to be managed by a central committee composed of representatives of each of the two agencies. There was an assumption implicit in this agreement that the technical and the social sub-systems could be created separately and then merged.
The second action was to initiate a pilot project at Laur in Central Luzon to experiment with a more integrated approach in which the capacity of the water user association would be developed through active involvement in the planning and construction activities: planning system layout, obtaining water rights and rights of way, organizing volunteer labor inputs to system construction, and exerting control over project expenditures.'2
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMTNT
Integrating social and technical development proved extremely difficult. In one community it was learned how difficult dealing with local power struggles can be-leading to the abandonment of construction plans until the local association reorganized itself some two years later. In a second community it was learned that high level of commitment from a cohesive farmer group does not necessarily make things easier for the engineers: scheduling and system design issues resulted in numerous delays and changes; organization of volunteer labor presented unfamiliar problems worked out only through lengthy meetings; and farmer insistence on monitoring purchases and limiting personal use of vehicles using gasoline charged to the farmers' loan accounts was not always welcomed by project engineers. The farmers even questioned the engineers on basic technical judgments, such as the type of material chosen for dam construction, insisting that the proposed structure would not withstand the force of local floods. Finally, however, the new dam was completed using the design favored by NIA's design engineers-only to be washed out a few months later.
The experience was sobering in the difficulties which it suggested the NIA must face if it were to work effectively in support of community managed irrigation; its capabilities on both the technical and the institutional side would need to be upgraded and integrated. Numerous changes in operating procedures were implied. Yet, it established in the minds of NIA's leadership that there were major benefits to be gained in return. Not only could farmer participation in system planning and construction result in a stronger water user association better equipped to operate and maintain the finished system, but it could also result in a better designed and constructed irrigation system more likely to meet farmer needs. The result was a strengthened commitment by one of the largest public agencies in the Philippines (43,000 employees) to build a new capacity for community level action.
Though still unfolding, the NIA experience is off special interest in providing a model of organizational change by which a large, established, bureaucratic, technology-based, public organization may be able to redesign its programs and structures through a bottom-up, field based, learning While awareness is becoming widespread that the blueprint approach is an inadequate response to rural development problems, its assumptions and procedures continue to dominate most rural development programming and... most development management training.
Work on the first NIA pilot systems had begun in 1976. Three and a half years later the first steps were being taken to seed the larger organization. At least three and a half more years would be required before the new methods would be understood throughout the organization." That seven years may be required for such a change process had important implications, as it extends well beyond the programming cycles of most donors and planning agencies. It requires commitment, patience, and substantial continuity of leadership to confront the difficulties which are encountered on an almost daily basis. Even though these have been present in the NIA, there still is no assurance the effort will succeed. All the pilot systems in which the new appioach is being developed received intensive attention from all levels of management and numerous outside experts. The intensity of input per system is gradually being reduced and the details of a phased dissemination process are being worked out with the usual care. Yet it remains to be seen whether the new styles of working with farmers can be sustained on a larger scale and whether certain mansgement system problems, some of which fall beyond the control of NIA's management, can be resolved."9
Peasant Movements
That the rural poor can be mobilized for significant action on felt needs is most dramatically illustrated by the experience of successful peasant movements. Important to the process is a strong, generally charismatic leader who can articulate his followers' feelings about their repressed conditions and with whom they can build a personal identification. Among people traditionally more oriented to vertical than to horizontal relationships, the leader first serves as a psychological replacement for the patron whose image is shifting from that of father figure to tyrant. As this displacement takes place the process of consciousness raising can proceed toward development of a sense of horizontal class solidarity.84
Examination of the history and dynamics of successful peasant movements provides unsettling insights into what constitute the most deeply felt of peasant needs and a powerful reminder that participation in decision making and resource control involves potentially volatile political issues. Implicit is the question of whether the "real" needs of the rural poor can be addressed by working from within established societal frameworks. The cases of successful Asian rural development experiences examined in this section suggest that, though difficult, the possibility may exist if action is taken on the lessons they offer.
Social Intervention as a Learning Process
These cases of relatively promising experience reflect a remarkable diversity. In some of the initiative came from government; in others it was private or mixed. Some origi-SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 nated in national policy while others emerged from the bottom-up as a local effort was built into a program with international visibility. Some dealt with a relatively narrow concern such as milk production, irrigation, or contraceptive distribution, while others took a comprehensive approach to the needs of given village communities. Some involved specific commitment to the poor while others made no distinction between the rural classes.
Achieving Fit: Blueprint versus Learning Process
Apparently the determinants of success cannot be found in an easily replicable program variable-whether private or public, multi-purpose or single-purpose, broadly or narrowly defined target group. Each project was successful because it had worked out a program model responsive to the beneficiary needs at a particular time and place and each had built a strong organization capable of making the program work. Put another way, they had achieved a high degree of fit between program design, beneficiary needs, and the capacities of the assisting organization. (See Figure 2 .)
The concept of fit has assumed a central importance in the fields of business policy and organizational design as research has illuminated the important relationships between task, context, and organi7ational variables, concluding that the performance of an organization is a function of the fit achieved between those variables."5 Although the concept is simple, the elements that go into achieving fit are varied and complex, especially when the concept is applied to participative rural development.
Between the intended beneficiaries and the program, the critical fit to be achieved is between beneficiary needs and the particular resources, and services made available to the community as program outputs. Beneficiary needs, of course, are a function of the political, economic, and social context in which the beneficiaries live and cannot be adequately defined for purposes of determining program input requirements independently of that context. Between beneficiaries and the assisting organization, the critical fit is between the means by which beneficiaries are able to define and communicate their needs and the processes by which the organization makes decisions. This may require changes both at the community level-developing a way for the poor to express their needs-and the assisting organization's level-developing ways for the organization to respond to such information." The way in which this fit is achieved will largely determine whether the intervention builds or diminishes the community's capacity for local problem solving.
Between the program and the organization, the critical fit is between the task requirements of the program and the distinctive competence of the organization. The task requirements consist of whatever the organization's members must do to produce the inputs and make them available to the beneficiaries. The distinctive competence of the organization relates to the structures, routines, and norms which govern the organization's functioning and the technical and social capabilities it brings to bear in providing the program. '7 The specific solutions which the various programs examined had found to the requirement for fit varied substantially, and each was probably unique to a particular time and set of circumstances. Thus, the commonalities that may be looked to as providing important lessons are not found in their final program or organizational blueprints, but rather in the process by which both program and organization were developed concurrently. These experiences help to illuminate why effective fit is so seldom achieved in rural development efforts through the prevailing blueprint approach to development programming. Their comparative success was based on a rather different process of bottomup program and organizational development, a learning process approach." The Blueprint Approach. The textbook version of how development programming is supposed to work is labelled the blueprint approach in recognition of its emphasis on careful pre-planning. Its key elements are shown in Figure  3 . Researchers are supposed to provide data from pilot projects and other studies which will allow the planners to choose the most cost effective project design for achieving a given development outcome and to reduce it to a blueprint for implementation. Administrators of the implementing organization are supposed to execute the project plan faithfully, much as a contractor would follow construction blueprints, specifications, and schedules. An evaluation researcher is supposed to measure actual changes in the target population and report actual versus planned changes to the planners at the end of the project cycle so that the blueprints can be revised. The blueprint approach has an appealing sense of order, specialization, and recognition of the superordinate role of the intellectual which makes it easily defensible in budget presentations. Indeed, its emphasis on well-planned and clearly defined projects with discrete and visible outcomes is well suited to the construction of a large-scale, physical infrastructure where the task is defined, the outcomes terminal, the environment stable, and the costs predictable. However, in rural development objectives are more often multiple, ill-defined and subject to negotiated change, task requirements unclear, outcomes unbounded by time, environments unstable, and costs unpredictable. ' Where knowledge is nearly non-existent, the blueprint approach calls for behaving as if knowledge were nearly perfect. Where the need is to build capacity for sustained development action, it assumes that development actions are terminal and that temporary organizations will suffice.'3 Where the need is for a close integration of knowledge building, decision making, and action taking roles, it sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional locations of the researcher, the planner, and the administrator.
While awareness is becoming widespread that the blueprint approach is an inadequate response to the rural development problem,' its assumptions and procedures continue to dominate most rural development programming and to provide the core content of most development managment training. This situation probably will continue until greater attention is given to the explication of viable options.
The Learning Process Approach. Examination of the Asian success cases suggests that the blueprint approach never played more than an incidental role in their development. These five programs were not designed and implemented-rather they emerged out of a learning process in which villagers and program personnel shared their knowledge and resources to create a program which achieved a fit between needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and those of the outsiders who were providing the assistance. Leadership and teamwork, rather than blueprints, were the key elements. Often the individuals who emerged as the central figures were involved at the very initial stage in this village experience, learning at first hand the nature of beneficiary needs and what was required to address them effectively. As progress was made in dealing with the problem of fit between beneficiary and program, attention was given either to building a supporting organization around the requirements of the program, or to adapting the capabilities of an existing orgamization to fit those requirements. Both program and organization emerged out of a learning process in which research and action were integrally linked.
The National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) is perhaps a prototype of this bottom-up program and organization building process. The outlines of the model were worked out largely by a group of small village dairy producers to meet their own needs. The young Kurien brought technical and marketing skills, and out of their collective knowledge and commitment a strong supporting infrastructure was fashioned, eventually resulting in an official program of national scope.
The Community Based Family Planning Service (CBFPS) provides a parallel experience involving less complex technologies and support requirements. Another young man of strong personality and village experience, Mechai, engaged in collaboration with villagers to try out an idea for making contraceptives more available. Out of early experimentation a program model and a well-defined supporting organization emerged, growing and adapting with the expansion of the program.
The program of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) moved rapidly through three distinct phases as it learned from its early errors. In the first stage it largely acted for the people, in the second the people were drawn into participation in BRAC defined programs, and in the third it organized the people and responded in support of their initiatives. Organizational strength built through the experience of the earlier phases made possible the third phase in which an unusually high degree of fit was achieved. Researcher, villager, and outreach worker all engaged directly in the process of building and using the knowledge base for improved program design. The result proved so powerful in its response to felt needs that a process of spontaneous replication was set in motion.
The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement (SSM) offers a variation on the three stages of BRAC's development though growth was faster, and the fit was weaker. It began as an effort to (1) provide school boys with an experience which would raise their consciousness regarding the life of poor villagers and (2) help break down the social barriers which isolated Sri Lanka's most discriminated castes. This early experience, in which its leadership was shaped, consisted primarily of sponsoring short work-study camps. At this stage there was a fairly good fit between the needs of the school boys, the program, and the supporting organization. But as the Sarvodaya leaders became more sensitized to the needs of the rural poor, they realized the need for more sustained development action. A substantial shift was made in program focus, but with too little attention to implementational details prior to the creation of a substantially expanded organization to enlarge program coverage. The result was a highly centralized and ill-defined organizational structure which fit poorly with program requirements and had inadequate mechanisms for relating to beneficiary demands, while isolating its leadership from contact with operating realities. Recognizing these deficiencies after several years, a research mechanism was eventually introduced to facilitate feedback and corrective action through involving villagers and staff in collecting, assessing, and acting on program performance data.
The National Irrigation Administration's (NIA) new participative style communals program was still at an early stage of development, but it illustrates an explicit effort to simulate within a large established organization the type of SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 bottom-up program design and organization building process of the NDDB, BRAC, CBFPS experiences. NIA personnel first worked with village people to evolve a more suitable program model, and, then, they gradually worked to build into the larger NIA organization the capabilities needed to achieve a fit with the new program model's task requirements. This included a variety of training seminars, replication of the pilot project learning experiences, additions of new types of personnel such as community organizers, and changes in organi7ational structures and procedures.
The data on peasant movements suggest an almost remarkably parallel to the bottom-up, capacity building process which built on first-hand knowledge of the people and their needs. This has led to the creation of institutional capacities better able to address these needs using largely locally available resources. If the success of any such movement was an outcome of project papers, social benefit-cost analyses, environmental impact statements, or PERT charts, the source documents examined made no mention of it.
The Learning Organization
Achieving fit through the learning process approach calls for organizations that have little in common with the implementing organizations geared to reliable adherence to detailed plans and conditions precedent favored in the blueprint approach. Its requirement is for organizations with a well developed capacity for responsive and anticipatory adaptation-organizaitons that: (a) embrace error; (b) plan with the people; and (c) link knowledge building with action.
Embracing Error. Preplanned interventions into varied and constantly changing socio-technical systems will nearly always prove to be in error by some margin in terms of producing the effect intended. The response to this error is one of the best available indicators of the quality of an organization's leadership.
There are three characteristic responses to error: to deny it, to externalize it, or to embrace it. Every individual has some tendencies toward each, but organizations develop norms reinforcing one or another tendency until it becomes a dominant characteristic.
The dominant response in the self-deceiving organization is to deny error. If top management treats error as an indication of personal incompetence, the organization's members will rapidly become highly skilled in making sure that errors are hidden. This can be quite reassuring to those removed from operating reality as it confirms their self image as competent leaders. They can impress visitors with their polished briefings, fully confident that their centrally planned and administered program is achieving the intended impact on the beneficiaries. Such briefings sometimes impress the unwary, but the claim that a program is working exactly as originally planned is an almost sure sign to the alert observer that the organization suffers form a serious information blockage that is hiding errors and preventing learning. A trip to the field is likely to reveal a largely inoperative program able to accomplish little more than completion of the forms on which accomplishments are reported. Where exceptions are found they will normally involve an unusually strong individual with a good sense of his or her community who has taken the initiative in working out a new program which achieves a fit with beneficiary needs, but which looks rather different than the one prescribed by program norms, and is achieved in spite of, rather than because of the larger organizations.
The defeated organization typically portrays a rather different public image, although its operating reality may closely resemble that of the self-deceiving organization. Its members speak openly and in rich detail of their organization's errors by way of pointing out how impossible their task is given the perversity of an environment which does not respond according to their wishes-they externalize the source of the error. Thus, error becomes impotence. As individuals reinforce each others' perceptions, they may come to feel so totally overcome by circumstances beyond their control that they do nothing-except to report their problems to higher management in the hope that someone will do something. But each level feels similarly defeated and only passes the problem on for attention by still higher authority. The lack of action further contributes to impotence and demoralization.
The learning organization embraces error.'5 Aware of the limitations of their knowledge members of this type of organization look on error as a vital source of data for making adjustments to achieve a better fit with beneficiary needs. An organization in which such learning is valued is characterized by the candor and practical sophistication with which its members discuss their own errors, what they have learned from them, and the corrective actions they are attempting. Intellectual integrity is combined with a sense of vitality and purpose. Such a climate in an organization is an almost certain indication of effective leadership.
Planning with the People. Rural people have a great deal to contribute to program design." They have a substantial capacity for learning and change,'7 but they also have good reason to be skeptical of the stranger bearing ideas for improving their lives untested in their setting. The history of rural development bears testament to the wisdom of their caution. One of numerous weaknesses of centrally designed programs is that planners proceed as if they were writing on a clean slate and possessing all the knowledge relevant to improving the villagers' life. In reality they are making interventions into well-established socio-technical systems within which the poor have, over many years, worked out appropriate methods to meet their basic survival needsotherwise they would not still be around. Sometimes they have come to terms with harsh trade-offs, as in the case of Indian hill tribes that hae learned to plant low yielding, early maturing grains rather than face the increased risk of death from starvation while waiting for the higher yielding varieties to mature." Such knowledge, crucial to any effort by outsiders to improve the well-being of the rural poor, is possessed by the people, but easily overlooked by planners who have not had-or do not seek-the opportunity to ask.
Building on what the people already know and the resources they already possess has numerous advantages. The SEtI'EMBER/OCTOBER 1980 adjustments required from them are more easily made and the risks of imposing new methods unsuited to their needs are substantially reduced. Also, indigenous technologies are usually within the control of the community. Building on, rather than replacing those technologies reduces the likelihood that the program intervention will "de-skill" the villagers and, thus, increase their dependence on external experts and suppliers over whom they have no social control. The successful programs involved substantial planning with the people, especially in their early stages in which the basic program models were developed. Generally, they built from and enhanced community capabilities while opening new options. Where outside dependence was involved, as to some extent it almost inevitably was, efforts were made to reduce the attendant risks.9
Linking Knowledge to Action. The blueprint approach commonly assumes that the knowledge required for the preparation of program designs can be generated independently of the organizational capacity required for its utiization.'1 This is reflected in its sharp differentiation between the roles of researcher, planner, and administrator-often assumed to be from different organizationswhich inevitably separates knowledge from decision from action. Those persons in day-to-day contact with the community reality and organi7ational function-the administrators, the field operations personnel, and the villagers-have no defined role in the definition of needs or the making of program design decisions. The decision making role is assigned, instead, to the individuals furthest removed from the relevant data-the professional planners.
Such separation is not found in the success cases examined. Especially in the early stages all three roles were combined in a single individual or a close knit team. Even as the organizations grew, the mode of operation stressed their integration. Researchers worked hand-in-hand with operating personnel, planning was done by those responsible for implementation, and top management spent substantial time in the field keeping in contact with operating reality. The process of rapid, creative adaptation essential to achieving and sustaining the fit on which effective performance depends nearly demands such integration.
It bears note that the same integration of roles is characteristic of the more successful pilot projects undertaken to provide design inputs to professional planners, although its significance is seldom noted. Unfortunately, their resemblance to the early field experiences on which major successful programs have been built ends there. Carried out as research studies, they are typically under the direction of a special research team, possibly from a university or research institute, and are carried out apart from the direct operational control of any operating agency that might apply their findings on a larger scale. After a predetermined time the project team is disbanded and its leaders return to the university to analyze and publish their data on the presumption that the final blueprint was the key to whatever results were obtained. What remains is an idea reduced to paper while the operating organization-the vibrant social organism which encompassed the skills, commitment, knowledge and systems required to give the idea life and adapt it to local circumstances as required-hass been discarded.
In fact, the effectiveness of a given program design is at least as dependent on the presence of an organization with a well developed capacity to make it work as it is on the specifics of the design itself. This is an important reason why pilot project results produced by one organization are seldom replicated by another. The blueprint approach implicitly assumes that any lack of fit between the task requirements of the program design and the capabilities of the organization eventually chosen to implement it can readily be corrected through short term training and possibly the introduction of new categories of personnel such as village level workers at the bottom of an existing structure. Seldom is attention given to the implications for higher organizational levels with the result that the new workers may find themselves required to conform to inappropriate procedures and dependent on unresponsive support systems which leave them unable to accomplish the tasks expected of them.01' By contrast, the NDDB, BRAC, CBFPS, and SSM were all organizations built up from the teams that created the original program. The functioning program and the organizational capacity to actuate it were both preserved in living form and both continued to evolve in response to further experience and the demands of expansion. In the NIA case, the field-based learning laboratories were sponsored by and under the operational control of the agency that intended to use the knowledge gained. These laboratories were designed not only to produce a program model, but also gradually to build the experience within the broader organization required to make it work. Where researchers were involved, they were in supporting rather than controlling roles.
In each instance the operating methods that were developed in the early stages were gradually translated into supportive management systems. The individuals who had created and sustained the fit were assigned to guide the learning experiences of others until they too gained the knowledge, commitment, and skills to make the program work. As the program moved into new communities, new lessons were learned, including lessons on how to maintain the fit between program and people as the organization expanded. New knowledge and the organizational capacity to put it to work were created simultaneously by one and the same process.
Three Stages of the Learning Process
In its idealized representation the learning process approach to program development proceeds through three stages. In each stage the emphasis is on a different learning task, successively on effectiveness, efficiency, and expansion. (See Figure 4. )
In Stage I-learning to be effective-the major concern is with developing a working program model in the setting of a village level learning laboratory that has a high degree of fit with beneficiary needs. Normally this phase will be resource intensive, particularly rich in its requirements for intellectual input, and will require substantial freedom from SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 499 normal administrative constraints. It is a time of investment in knowledge and capacity building-learning what is required to achieve fit for a given time and setting. Not only does this stage involve basic learning about community dynamics, and even learning what are the relevant questions to be asked, but it also involves learning how to learn through an action research process. As in the beginning of any learning process it should be considered normal for error rates to be high, though on a downward trend, and efficiency low. The program begins to make the transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 when it is found to be effective in responding to an identified need and it achieves an acceptable level of fit between beneficiaries, the working program model, and the capabilities of the action research team.
In Stage 2-learning to be efficient-the major concern shifts to reducing the input requirements per unit of output. Through careful analysis of Stage 1 experience, extraneous activities not essential to effectiveness are gradually eliminated and the important activities routinized. While there may also be some continued gains in effectiveness with further experience, it is more likely that some loss of effectiveness with further experience, it is more likely that some loss of effectiveness will be a necessary price of increasing efficiency. In Stage 2, there should also be serious attention paid to the problem of achieving fit between program requirements and realistically attainable organizational capacities, recognizing the organizational constraints that will have to be accepted in the course of program expansion. Modest program expansion during Stage 2 will increase the cadre of persons experienced in making the program work available to help build the expanded organizational capability required in Stage 3. Once acceptable levels of effectiveness and efficiency have been obtained, the program model reasonably stabilized, an expanded cadre trained, and basic management systems requirements worked out, then the way is prepared for transition to Stage 3.
In Stage 3-learning to expand-the central concern is with an orderly phased expansion of the program. The emphasis will be on expansion of organizational capacity, though continued refinements may also be required in the program to respond to the demands of larger scale operation. But constant attention must be given to ensuring that an acceptable level of fit is maintained even though expansion will mean some inevitable sacrifice in effectiveness and efficiency. The rate of expansion will be governed largely by how fast the necessary organizational capabilities can be developed to support it. The specifics of how each stage is structured will differ substantially depending on whether a new organization is being built anew from the bottom-up or whether the task is to build an appropriate new capacity in an existing organization, as in the case of the NIA.
When the case study was prepared, the NIA was in Stage 2 in the development of its new communals program. The intensity of the research and organizer inputs was being reduced gradually in the pilot schemes, certain procedures that had proven effective were being routinized, and attention was being given to the eventual problems to be faced in achieving fit between the larger organi7ation and the program task requirements. BRAC was also well into Stage 2 with its Phase III program, as the village level change processes it had initiated began to take on their own momentum, increasing program output per unit of BRAC staff input. The contraceptive delivery system of the CBFPS had increased efficiency to the point where it had become essentially self-financing and its expansion phase was already completed; it had completed Stage 3 and its leadership was looking for new challenges. The NDDB had moved well into Stage 3 expansion and was also beginning to venture into new fields.
The SSM offers a parallel to the BRAC in having introduced fundamental changes in program orientation during the course of its history, but without reinitiating the learning process sequence. Instead, it moved almost directly into rapid expansion. Consequently it found itself in a situation somewhat analogous to that of the NIA; i.e., a large establihed bureaucracy with an established program that was not producing the desired results. Finally, recognizing the nature of the problem, action was taken to initiate an internal learning process directed to achieving improved fit.
A look at the successful programs in relationship to their learning curves highlights an important feature of their success. They were not "designed and implemented." They, and the organizations that sustained them, "evolved and grew. "
The Social Scientist as Capacity Builder It would seem that the social scientist should have a central role to play in participative rural development given the substantial need for new capacity to address social variables; and, indeed, social scientists currently enjoy unprecedented demand for their services in the Third World. However, they, so far, seem to have had little influence on the design or performance of the typical rural development program. This is not surprising considering the types of activities they have most often been called upon to do. * Summative Evaluation. This generally consists of documenting failure after the time for corrective action has long past. * Pilot Projects. Commonly located outside of the agency with program responsibility and designed to produce a program blueprint for application by others, the focus is on the wrong product-an idea which is not backed by the capacity to make it operational. * Baseline Surveys. Substantial amounts of social science data may be gathered, presumably as a basis for planning decisions. But the data are often irrelevant to planning, and even if they were not, the organizations to which results are directed seldom have a capacity to use them for other than selective use in justifying decisions made on other grounds."2 Thus, the products which the social scientist is commonly called upon to produce are either untimely, or unusable by the consumers to whom they are supposedly targeted. Rarely is the social scientist called on to help an organization build a capacity to actually use social science knowledge and data in ways that would contribute directly to improving performance. At least four exceptions are found among the success cases: BRAC, NIA, SSM, and CBFPS.
In each, there has been a healthy skepticism of the more conventional research methods and researcher role relationships. They have experimented with new methods and roles which put the researcher in the position of providing the action agency personnel with simple tools to facilitate their rapid collection and interpretation of social data directly relevant to action. To be effective in these roles the social scientists involved have led to become intimately familiar with agency operations, engaging themselves in a process of learning how they could become more relevant to their client's needs.
They have sought to demystify the social sciences, making it every person's tool, turning both agency personnel and in some instances the villagers themselves into more effective action researchers. They have stressed disciplined observation, guided interviews, and informant panels over formal surveys; timeliness over rigor; oral over written communication; informed interpretation over statistical analysis; narrative over numerical presentation; and attention to process and intermediate outcomes as a basis for rapid adaptation over detailed assessment of "final" outcomes. Rather than the static profiles provided by typical socioeconomic surveys, they have sought an understanding of the dynamics of the socio-technical systems that govern village life as a basis for improving predictions of the consequences of any given development intervention. They have sought specific identification of target group members and behavior in terms relevant to program action.m' It is not uncommon for the leaders of programs which have learned to make effective use of social science research to draw a sharp distinction between the more conventional baseline surveys and formal evaluation studies their organizations do "because the donors want them," and the research integral to action which drives their own program and organizational development processes. Their lack of enthusiasm for the former is not out of fear of exposure, but out of concern that these types of research contribute little to improving performance, while commanding attention and resources better used elsewhere. 
Conclusion: A Need for Action Based Capacity Building
The concepts and methods of the blueprint approach may be more of a hindrance than an aid in the programming of effective rural development action where the need is for an adaptive, bottom-up process of program and organizational development through which an adequate fit may be achieved between beneficiary needs, program outputs, and organizational competence. This calls not for more sophisticated skills in the preparation of detailed project plans, but rather for skills in building capacities for action through action.
Of course, just as very few centrally planned rural development programs achieve the three-way fit required for effective performance, few of the many village based development efforts which do achieve fit on a local basis ever develop into capacities for sustained action on a significant scale. Perhaps they lack a strategy for progressing successively through the three basic stages of learning to be effective, learning to be efficient, and learning to expand. Greater understanding of the requirements of the learning process approach on the part of funding agencies may be of particular importance given their dominant influence on programming strategies and methods, though the changes they must make if they are to apply its lessons are substantial. For example, a portion of their funding portfolios might be programmed not around sectors, but around individuals with the leadership qualities, the ideas, and the commitment to advancing the cause of rural people from which substantial programs might be built. This would provide the recipient change agents with the flexible funding which might allow them over a period of five to ten years to carry their idea through the three developmental stages to the building of a major mature program. '1 The details for both operating agency and funder would vary substantially depending on purpose, setting, whether government or private, whether a new or an established organization, whether locally or internationally funded, and the particular learning stage to which the program had advanced.15 But the essential nature of the process would remain much the same. The constant elements would include the requirements for leadership, demanding intellectual discipline, freedom to deviate from the initial plan and budget, and continuing attention to staff development through action based learning. 
